The Heeding Presumption and Its Application: Distinguishing No Warning from Inadequate Warning by Bohmholdt, Karin L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-2003
The Heeding Presumption and Its Application:
Distinguishing No Warning from Inadequate
Warning
Karin L. Bohmholdt
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karin L. Bohmholdt, The Heeding Presumption and Its Application: Distinguishing No Warning from Inadequate Warning, 37 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 461 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol37/iss2/7
THE HEEDING PRESUMPTION AND ITS
APPLICATION: DISTINGUISHING NO
WARNING FROM INADEQUATE WARNING
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the essential goals of products liability law is to create
safer and better products for the consumer. Rules for establishing the
causation element of product liability causes of action should reflect
that goal.' With this goal in mind, many states have adopted the
"heeding presumption" to establish causation in failure to warn
2actions. A plaintiff/user3 who benefits from the presumption need
not prove that the manufacturer's failure to warn of a product's
danger caused the plaintiff's injury.4 Instead, the trier of fact
presumes causation-that an adequate warning would have been
1. See, e.g., Richard C. Henke, The Heeding Presumption in Failure to
Warn Cases: Opening Pandora's Box?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 174, 188
(1999) [hereinafter Opening Pandora's Box]. But see MARSHALL S. SHAPO,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 103-04 (1993)
[hereinafter SHAPO, SEARCH FOR JUSTICE] (presenting a "competing" view that
the role of products liability is simply to allocate loss when injury occurs.).
2. States that have adopted the presumption include Arkansas, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Dakota,
New Jersey, New York, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, and the
District of Columbia. Benjamin J. Jones, Annotation, Presumption or
Inference, in Products Liability Action Based on Failure to Warn, That User
Would Have Heeded an Adequate Warning Had One Been Given, 38 A.L.R.
5th 683, 701-04 § 3 (2002).
3. Throughout this Note, reference will sometimes be made to the plaintiff
as "plaintiff/user." Often, the plaintiff will not be the actual user-for
example, in cases involving children or wrongful death suits. Both terms are
used here because the conduct of the user is relevant, but the plaintiff, who
may be a different person, receives the benefit of the presumption.
4. See, e.g., Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.
1972) ("Where there is no warning.., the presumption that the user would
have read an adequate warning works in favor of the plaintiff user.").
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followed and the plaintiff/user would not have been injured. The
burden then falls on the manufacturer to rebut the presumption.
Jurisdictions differ in their applications of the presumption.
Courts must determine how the presumption works in inadequate
warning cases as opposed to "no warning actions."6  Some
jurisdictions conclude that if a given warning was not read or
followed, the plaintiff may no longer benefit from the presumption
and thus must prove causation to the trier of fact.7 For some, this
approach does not adequately reflect the goals of products liability
law because it removes the focus from product safety and places it
upon the consumer's action or inaction.
8
This Note argues that the heeding presumption should be
applied differently in no warning cases and inadequate warning
cases. Specifically, the heeding presumption should not be applied
when a warning has been given and the user has failed to read or
5. See, e.g., House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 552-53 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (applying the rebuttable heeding presumption to a products
liability claim).
6. See Opening Pandora's Box, supra note 1, at 185-89. Throughout this
Note, an "inadequate warning case" refers to those cases in which a warning
has been provided, but the warning could be determined by the trier of fact to
have been inadequate. A case in which no warning has been given may be
fairly labeled a "no warning case." The "failure to warn cause of action" refers
to either situation.
7. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex.
1993) (holding that when a warning is given, but plaintiff failed to read it, the
presumption no longer applies); see also Johnson v. Niagra Mach. & Tool
Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff's
failure to read the existing warning was sufficient to support the district court's
decision to grant a directed verdict); Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd.,
866 F. Supp. 1221, 1236 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (holding that "a plaintiff who does
not read an allegedly inadequate warning cannot maintain a negligent-failure-
to-adequately-warn action unless the nature of the alleged inadequacy is such
that it prevents him from reading it." (quoting E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v.
Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 971 (Ala. 1985))); cf Safeco Ins. Co. v. Baker, 515 So.
2d 655, 657 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that although the presumption is
applied, there must be "some reasonable connection between the omission of
the manufacturer and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." (quoting
Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839 (La. 1987))).
8. See Opening Pandora 's Box, supra note 1, at 189 (stating that the goals
of product safety are not served by distinguishing between cases of inadequate
warning and no warning).
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follow the given instruction.9  Instead, the plaintiff should be
required to prove causation to the trier of fact by showing that he or
she would have heeded a better warning.
Part II of this Note will explain the development of the heeding
presumption and the policy goals that underlie its application. Part
III will show that the policy goals of products liability law apply
differently in inadequate warning cases, and will explain the benefits
of this distinction. First, it will show that the failure to warn cause of
action is fundamentally different from other products liability causes
of action that focus solely on the safety of the product without
reference to conduct.'0 Second, it will demonstrate that the usual
rationales for using evidentiary presumptions in general do not apply
to the case where a warning has been provided. Part IV concludes
that while the heeding presumption may be a desirable way to
balance fairness to injured plaintiffs with economic incentive effects
to manufacturers, these goals are not sufficiently promoted in an
inadequate warning case to justify shifting the burden of proof.
Whether or not the number of products liability suits has
increased following recent tort reform efforts is in debate.'"
Nevertheless, given the changing climate of tort law, critical
attention must be paid to the balance of risk arising from fairness and
economic concerns that have historically shaped products liability
9. Because of the complexities associated with drug and pharmaceutical
products, this Note does not address those products. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(m) (1998).
10. Such as the strict product liability causes of action for design defect or
for manufacturing defect. These causes of action necessarily focus mainly on
the safety of the product as it is the very nature of the product that gives rise to
the cause of action, although the design defect cause of action may depend in
part on conduct as well.
11. Compare Bruce A. Finzen & Brooke B. Tassoni, Regulation of
Consumer Products: Myth, Reality and the Media, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
523, 537 (2002) (stating that the volume of torts litigation has "declined
steadily" since 1990) with Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, Who Should
Pay? The Product Liability Debate, 4 IssuEs IN ETHIcs, Spring 1991 (stating
that the number of products liability suits is rising), available at
http://www.scu.edu/Ethics/publications/iie/v4nl/pay.html, and Archie W.
Dunham, Build on Strength: A Businessman Speaks Up, Address at National
Press Club (Oct. 28, 2002) (asserting that the explosion of products liability
suits has not made the public safer), at http://
www.conocophillips.conilnews/speeches/102802Lnpc.asp.
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law.' 2 Treating the no warning case differently from the inadequate
warning case with respect to causation is an effective way to address
those concerns.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEEDING PRESUMPTION
Causation has long been regarded as a necessary element of any
tort cause of action.' 3 When the defendant's conduct does not cause
the injury at issue, recovery is denied.' 4 Even supporters of strict or
enterprise liability for products liability recognize that causation is
still a necessary element of the cause of action.' 5 However, over
time, courts have developed the rebuttable presumption of causation
in the failure to warn cause of action. In order to analyze the
development of the law that led some courts to adopt the heeding
presumption, it is necessary to understand the basic foundations of
products liability law. Accordingly, this section gives a brief outline
of products liability causes of action.
A. Products Liability Causes of Action and Causation
There are three primary causes of action in products liability
law.16 It is important to recognize the distinction between these three
causes of action because they illustrate that there are different ways
in which a product can be considered unsafe, but that not all of those
depend entirely upon the product. The three causes of action
12. See SHAPO, SEARCH FOR JUSTICE, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
13. See ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL
CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 43-45 (1961) ("A
case [of liability without causation] can seldom arise in tort."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15 cmt. a (1998) ("defect of which
the plaintiff complains [must] cause harm to person or property.") (emphasis
added). For a discussion of the difficulties in determining causation, see Jane
Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REv. 941 (2001).
14. See BECHT & MILLER, supra note 13, at 87-98.
15. See VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 169 (1995) ("the proposed doctrine would impose a strict enterprise
liability for personal injuries arising out of the use of business premises.")
(emphasis added).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2
(1998). A plaintiff may have alternative causes of action in negligence that
may be relevant to a discussion of policy. Id. § 2 cmt. n. This Note is limited
however, to a discussion of the products liability causes of action.
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necessarily depend on different factors and therefore should be
treated differently when determining whether or not the plaintiff has
met his or her prima facie case. The differing treatment of the failure
to warn cause of action can be justified as an effort to achieve the
same goals.
1. The manufacturing defect cause of action
A plaintiff s first theory of liability under products liability is the
manufacturing defect cause of action. A plaintiff may claim that
there was a defect in the manufacture of the particular unit of product
that caused the plaintiff's injury. 17 In order to prove a manufacturing
defect, a plaintiff must prove that "the product departs from its
intended design."' 8 It is irrelevant that the manufacturer took "all
possible care.., in the preparation and marketing of the product."'19
It can be assumed that in order to avoid this cost of business,
manufacturers will take steps to prevent defects in manufacture.
Causation is ultimately proven by showing that the plaintiff
would not have been injured had the manufacturer behaved
differently in making the product. Thus, the focus here is solely on
the safety of the product as manufactured and not on the consumer's
conduct.
2. The design defect cause of action
A plaintiffs second cause of action is the design defect theory
of liability.20 This cause of action is far more complex than the
manufacturing defect cause of action and has been approached in
various ways. It is especially important to understand the various
approaches to this particular cause of action because causation of
injury under this cause of action, like the failure to warn cause of
action, sometimes refers to the user.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a product is
defectively designed if it is more dangerous than an ordinary
consumer would expect.2 1 This approach is sometimes referred to as
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) cmt. i (1965).
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the "consumer expectations test.' 22 Over time, many courts have
declined to adopt this approach to the defective design cause of
action and have instead applied a risk-utility analysis.23 The risk-
utility test focuses on the product, stating that a plaintiff, in order to
prevail on a design defect claim, must show a "reasonable alternative
design. 24  Unlike the consumer expectations test, this cause of
action focuses solely on the product design and is not a standard that
involves the consumer.
Jurisdictions that refuse to follow the consumer expectations test
do so for different reasons. California courts, for example, have long
applied the consumer expectations test to design defect cases.25
However, as Daniel Herling points out, recent decisions indicate that
California may begin to turn away from that approach.26 In Soule v.
General Motors Corp.,27 the California Supreme Court noted that an
ordinary consumer might not have expectations about a particular
product, but that the product might nevertheless cause injury.28 This
concern shifts the focus entirely to the product's safety and potential
for causing injury. Although the consumer expectations test relies on
the average consumer to determine what is considered an adequate
design, the product's safety itself is unchanged by the reasonable
consumer's expectations. The test functions as a mere benchmark
for determining defect.
22. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. a
(1998).
24. Id. § 2(b).
25. See, e.g., Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 413.
26. See Daniel J. Herling, Jury Instructions: Consumer Expectations Test
Continues to Erode in Design Defect Claims, (suggesting that California courts
would not apply the consumer expectations test as often as they had in past
decisions), at http://www.duanemorris.com/publications/pub829.html (Apr. 1,
2002); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe,
Japan, and Other Countries Can Learn from the New American Restatement of
Products Liability, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 15 n.72, 16 (1999) (discussing why
the legal standard for defective design should be based on the risk utility
analysis rather than consumer expectations).
27. 8 Cal. 4th 548, 882 P.2d 298, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 (1994).
28. See id. at 562 (citing Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430).
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Both the consumer expectations and the risk utility test maintain
focus on the product, even if they can be fairly said to consider some
conduct as well.29
3. The failure to warn cause of action
The third cause of action, the one with which this Note is
concerned, involves the failure to warn a consumer of known or
knowable risks of harm that may come from using an otherwise non-
defective product.30  In the failure to warn cause of action, the
plaintiff must establish that the product is defective because it did not
contain an adequate warning of some danger the product posed to the
plaintiff/user.3' Unlike the design defect and manufacturing defect
causes of action, the failure to warn cause of action is entirely
dependent upon the effect a warning has on a plaintiff/user. "[T]he
efficacy of a warning necessarily depends upon how well it performs
on average.
' 32
B. Application of the Presumption in a Failure to Warn
Cause ofAction
Courts are unwilling to eliminate the causation element of any
tort, but have been willing to apply presumptions and shift the
burden in certain circumstances.33
29. See Martin A. Kotler, Reconceptualizing Strict Liability in Tort: An
Overview, 50 VAND. L. REV. 555 (1997).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c)
(1998).
31. See id. Again, the failure to warn cause of action does not currently
distinguish, as this Note does, between no warning and inadequate warning.
The claim is proven by showing that an adequate warning was not given.
32. Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 309, 323 (1997).
33. In fact, courts have been adamant that proof of causation cannot be
excused, even in strict liability cases. See Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480
S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. 1972):
In strict liability cases, proof of negligence is excused; but neither
Section 402A ... nor our former decisions have excused proof that the
defect in the product was the cause of the injuries... "The prime
requirement for imposing liability on a seller under the rule of strict
liability is proof by the plaintiff that he was injured because of a
defective condition in the product..."
Id. (citing Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburg v. Ponder, 443
S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1969)).
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Courts such as the New Jersey Supreme Court have developed
the presumption of causation in a failure to warn cause of action. For
example, in Coffinan v. Keene Corp.34 the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated that although in a failure to warn claim, "[t]he plaintiff
must demonstrate... that the [failure to warn] ... was a proximate
cause of the injury," the court would nevertheless apply the
rebuttable heeding presumption and shift the burden of proving lack
of causation to the defendant.35 Some courts consider it unfair to
prevent a plaintiff from recovering anything for his or her injuries
when it is admittedly difficult to determine whether or not the failure
to warn was the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the injury.
36
Coffinan was one of the seminal cases that articulated the
heeding presumption and has been followed by numerous
jurisdictions in the development of the presumption. In Coffinan, a
naval electrician sued the Keene Corporation, a manufacturer of
naval vessel materials that contained asbestos, for injuries caused by
asbestos exposure.37 The plaintiff claimed that Keene Corporation
failed to warn users of the health risks that could arise from working
with the asbestos-based products.38 The trial court applied the
heeding presumption over Keene Corporation's objection that the
34. 628 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993).
35. Id. at 716-20 (citation omitted). The burden of persuasion may not, in
technical terms, shift to the defendant if the presumption is applied. See
ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO AMERICAN TRIALS, ch. 4 (1998). However, if the
jury is instructed that causation is presumed if it finds that an inadequate
warning was provided, then the practical effect is that the defendant must
prove otherwise, and the burden of production is shifted. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also House v. Armour of Am. Inc.,
886 P.2d 542, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[the] rebuttable presumption shifts
[the] plaintiffs burden on causation"); James A. Henderson & Aaron D.
Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure
to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 289-91 (1990) (discussing the lack of
restraints on juries in failure to warn causes of action) [hereinafter Doctrinal
Collapse in Products Liability]; cf Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850
(La. 1987) (when a plaintiff proves a warning was inadequate, "his cause in
fact burden is assisted by a presumption... The presumption, may, however,
be rebutted if the manufacturer produces contrary evidence which persuades
the trier of fact that an adequate warning or instruction would have been futile
under the circumstances.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
36. Coffinan, 628 A.2d at 718.
37. Id. at 715.
38. Id.
468
THE HEEDING PRESUMPTION
plaintiff was required to show that lack of warning was the direct
cause of his injury.39 The Appellate Court affirmed, and the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted certification.40
In officially adopting the heeding presumption for proof of
causation, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Coffnan noted that they
"have often adopted or used presumptions in [the context of strict
products liability] in order to advance our goals of fostering greater
product safety and enabling victims of unsafe commercial products
to obtain fair redress. '41 It is this justification that is most often
advanced when applying the presumption.
In adopting this presumption, courts such as the New Jersey
Supreme Court found further justification in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment j. 42 Comment j reads:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or
warning, on the container, as to its use .... Where warning
is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be
read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning,
which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.43
The original intent behind comment j was to relieve
manufacturers of liability when an otherwise non-defective product
was distributed with an adequate warning.44 Courts that have
developed the heeding presumption have implied the reverse
assumption. Those courts have determined that once a plaintiff has
met its burden in establishing duty, breach, and damage, the plaintiff
need not establish legal causation.45
C. Removing the Burden of Proving Causation: The Policy Goals
The first rationale that has been advanced in favor of removing
the usual burden of proof of causation is that the presumption
39. Id.
40. See id. at 716.
41. Id. at 718.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) cmt. j (1965).
43. Id.
44. See Kevin Reynolds & Richard S. Kirschman, The Ten Myths of
Product Liability, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 551, 577 (2000).
45. See Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972).
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provides an incentive for manufacturers to provide product
warnings.46 A "basic duty" of manufacturers is to warn against
dangers inherent in their products.47 The presumption that a warning
would have been read if given is seen to prompt manufacturers to
provide warnings that will actually prevent injury.48
A second rationale proffered for the desirability of the
presumption is grounded in fairness. Since it is often difficult for a
plaintiff to prove what he or she might have done had the facts been
different, courts have been willing to provide this presumption.49
The argument is that it is better to allow a plaintiff to recover based
on the presumption than to let an injured plaintiff go
uncompensated.50 These rationales have been fiercely debated.5'
46. See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993) ("The
heeding presumption ... serves to reinforce the basic duty to warn-to
encourage manufacturers to produce safer products, and to alert users of the
hazards arising from the use of those products through effective warnings.");
see also Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 309, 312 (arguing that many sellers will not warn if the
presumption is not applied).
47. See Coffman, 628 A.2d at 723.
48. Seeid. at718.
49. See Technical Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d at 606 (recognizing that there
can be difficulties in proving causation, and that in some cases, determining
whether the user would have read and followed an adequate warning may be
"speculative").
50. See Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law,
54 VAND. L. REv. 1011, 1022 (2001).
51. For differing perspectives on the use of the heeding presumption in any
failure to warn cause of action, see Hildy Bowbeer, et al., Warning! Failure to
Read this Article May Be Hazardous to Your Failure to Warn Defense, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 439, 460-66 (2000) (discussing the criticisms of the
application of the heeding presumption); Kenneth Ian Weissman, A "Comment
J" Parry to Howard Latin 's "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 629, 638-55 (1996) (supporting the use of
the heeding presumption); see also Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability,
supra note 35, at 278-79 (arguing that the heeding presumption may be a
permissible means to determine causation, but that the presumption cannot "be
derived logically from comment j"). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402(A) cmt. j (1965) (stating: "Where warning is given, the seller
may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded... .") with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 15 cmt. a (1997)
(declining to adopt the presumption: "The rules that govern causation in tort
law generally are . . . also applicable in products liability cases."), and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1997)
("Notwithstanding the defective condition of the product in the absence of
THE HEEDING PRESUMPTION
D. The Development of the Distinction Between No Warning
and Inadequate Warning
A cursory reading of the cases involving the heeding
presumption might lead one to conclude that courts have applied the
heeding presumption equally in the no warning and inadequate
warning cases. However, as Professor Richard Henke points out,
there is a subtle jurisdictional difference in the application of the
presumption.52 Some jurisdictions allow the presumption to stand,
leaving the question of rebuttal in the hands of the jury without
regard to whether any warning has been given. 53 Other jurisdictions
take the position that the failure of the plaintiff/user to read existing
warnings precludes the plaintiff from benefiting from the
presumption.54 This approach requires the jury to find that the
failure to adequately warn was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff/user's injury based on the plaintiffs presentation of
evidence.
55
Texas courts have distinguished between the two types of cases.
In General Motors Corp. v. Saenz,56 the Texas Supreme Court noted:
The presumption operates differently in cases like
Technical Chemical... where no warning at all was given
concerning the improper use of the product which injured
[the] plaintiff, than it operates in cases like the present one,
in which the improper use is addressed by the
manufacturer's warning, but not adequately .... There is
no presumption that a plaintiff who ignored instructions that
would have kept him from injury would have followed
better instructions.
57
adequate warnings, if a particular user or consumer would have decided to use
or consume even if warned, the lack of warnings is not a legal cause of that
plaintiff's harm.") (emphasis added).
52. See Opening Pandora's Box, supra note 1, at 185.
53. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir.
1987).
54. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tex. 1993)
(holding that the presumption cannot apply in cases where the plaintiff/user did
not read existing warnings, even when those warnings were inadequate).
55. See id.
56. 873 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1993).
57. Id. at 359.
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As a justification for this difference, the court found that it was
irrational to allow the plaintiff to benefit from the presumption when
there was no evidence that it would have made a difference.58
In contrast, Kansas law, for example, allows the presumption to
stand even when a glaintiff/user failed to read existing, though
inadequate warnings. 5 In 0 'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc. ,60
the court held that the finding of an inadequate warning by the jury,
"resolve[d] any issue of... fault as well. 61
III. No WARNING V. INADEQUATE WARNING: BENEFITS OF THE
CAUSATION DISTINCTION
As stated above, whether or not the heeding presumption is
entirely appropriate is subject to much debate.62 However, adopting
the presumption in a no warning case arguably does further the goals
of products liability in that it encourages manufacturers to warn
against inherent risks of the product.
This incentive supports the policy of adopting the presumption.
In Coffinan, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that
the presumption was being adopted to further product safety goals.
63
The court further noted that the heeding presumption "minimizes the
likelihood that determinations of causation will be based on
unreliable evidence."'
64
Although considerable and persuasive arguments to the contrary
exist, the heeding presumption does appear to provide an incentive
for manufacturers to provide a warning to consumers if the product
poses a danger. Accordingly, it may be fair to take the rare step of
removing plaintiff's burden in such a situation.
Surely, however, if its application to no warning cases is
questionable, then it must be unacceptable to apply the presumption
58. See id.
59. See O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1444 ("A defendant may not limit its liability
by relying on a plaintiff s failure to heed an insufficient warning.").
60. 821 F.2d 1438 (10th. Cir. 1987).
61. Id. at 1444.
62. See supra note 51.
63. Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993).
64. Id. at 720. While some goals of products liability are furthered by the
application of the presumption, it seems ironic that the court would rather rely
on no evidence of causation rather than evidence that is "unreliable." See
Bowbeer, supra note 51, at 461.
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when the manufacturer has undertaken the costs associated with
providing a warning but the plaintiff/user simply fails to read and
heed.
There are several important policies to consider in determining
whether or not the presumption should apply in cases where a
warning has been given. First, other tort doctrines play a role in this
determination. The idea of contributory negligence is an important
factor to be considered. Second, the incentive effects that seem to
derive from the application of the presumption in a no warning case
do not justify the use of the presumption in the case of inadequate
warning. Finally, it may be beneficial for consumers in general to
support the application of the presumption only in the no warning
case.
A. Remembering the Critical Differences in the Failure to Warn
Cause of Action
As an initial matter, treating the causation element of the failure
to warn cause of action differently from other product liability causes
of action furthers doctrinal coherence. The failure to warn cause of
action is fundamentally different from the manufacturing and design
defect causes of action. Therefore, it can be fairly said that the
causation element should be treated differently as well.
The defect of the product in a failure to warn cause of action
depends not only upon how the average consumer would react, but
also upon how the particular plaintiff/user did or did not react. As
Henderson and Twerski point out, "warnings may reduce the risk of
product-related injury by allowing consumers to behave more
carefully than if they remained ignorant of the risks associated with
product use. By behaving more carefully, consumers help to achieve
the efficiency objective of tort law. 65  Marshall S. Shapo also
explains the important interaction between defect and conduct,
saying:
Although it is not always the case, in many situations the
moral choice [of how or if to use the product when warned
of danger] becomes the plaintiff's. That is why the
warnings issue frequently overlaps with the question of
65. Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability, supra note 35, at 285
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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whether the plaintiff should be barred from recovery
because of his or her own conduct.66
This is critically different from the design and manufacturing
causes of action. The manufacturing cause of action is wholly
focused on the particular product. No action or inaction of the
plaintiff can change the danger or safety of the product.67 The design
defect cause of action, too, is determined wholly by the safety of the
product as designed. Even the consumer expectations test does not
depend on the particular plaintiff's use of the product.68 It serves
only to provide a benchmark for when a product can be deemed
dangerously defective.69 In contrast, while the failure to warn cause
of action in part focuses on attempts to make the product safer, its
actual safety can only be changed by the action or inaction of the
user.
70
The failure to warn cause of action is less akin to strict liability
than the other two products liability causes of action. The failure to
warn cause of action depends far more on conduct than do the other
two, and the approaches to the cause of action should adequately
reflect that difference. If the heeding presumption is employed to
change conduct,7 1 then the focus must shift from being solely on the
product itself, and take into account the actions or inaction of the
parties in determining liability. The failure to warn cause of action
cannot be approached in the same manner as the other products
liability causes of action, not because its goals are different, but
because the cause of action is necessarily focused on conduct.
B. Application of Policy Goals to the Shifting of the Burden of Proof
As a practical matter, it may appear that the distinction is of
little consequence. One might argue that because the presumption
66. SHAPO, SEARCH FOR JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 139.
67. See supra Part II.A.1.
68. See supra Part llI.B.2.
69. See id.
70. See Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, supra
note 50, at 1019; see also Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and
Causation, supra note 32, at 323. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 2 cmt. 1 (1997) ("[W]hen an alternative design to
avoid risks cannot reasonably be implemented, adequate instructions and
warnings will normally be sufficient to render the product reasonably safe.").
71. See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993).
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may be rebutted relatively easily, the distinction is irrelevant.
However, if a court applies the presumption, it is incumbent upon the
defendant to prove these facts,72 facts that are ordinarily in the
possession of the plaintiff. If the court does not apply the
presumption, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.
Furthermore, if the presumption is not applied, the case may be
disposed of more easily at an earlier stage, such as summary
judgment, thereby saving the expense of trial."
While it may be true that a defendant may be able to rebut the
presumption and dispose of the case at an early stage even if the
presumption is applied, this is the case with any rebuttable
presumption. It therefore cannot be simply argued that the case
could come out the same way regardless of the presumption being
applied because then any presumption would make no practical
difference. The critical point here is that applying a presumption is
an extraordinary measure, as our system requires the plaintiff to
prove the prima facie case. Such an extraordinary measure should
require extraordinary justification.
To clarify this matter, if the presumption is applied, then the
matter is taken out of the hands of the jury, except with respect to
whether or not the defendant has successfully rebutted the
presumption. This is ordinarily not acceptable, as causation is
generally a question for the jury.74
1. The res ipsa loquitur comparison
There is an important policy analogy in the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. Under this doctrine courts will presume causation when
72. See Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus. Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1235
n.14 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (stating that the application of the presumption shifts
the burden of production to the defendant); Lonasco v. A-Best Prods. Co., 757
A.2d 367, 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that the defendant must produce
evidence that a warning would not have been heeded); Technical Chem. Co. v.
Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972) (stating that the presumption may be
rebutted if the manufacturer produces evidence that causation did not exist).
73. See Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability, supra note 35, at 325
("[T]he defendant is basically precluded from the opportunity to convince a
court to rule as a matter of law that the failure to warn was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's harm.") (citation omitted).
74. See Stapleton, supra note 13, at 944. ("Often there is a choice to
package a particular issue as one of duty, and therefore one for the court, or as
one of legal cause, and therefore one for the jury....").
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there is no other explanation for the plaintiff's injury.75 This is
considered acceptable because it is the defendant who possesses the
critical information.76 It is presumed that only the defendant can tell
whether or not its conduct caused the plaintiffs injury and therefore,
courts are willing to shift the burden.77 By contrast, in the case of
failure to warn, the plaintiff is the party who can best explain
causation, yet we are willing to allow him the benefit of the
presumption. The two simply do not fit together logically. While
this may call into question the appropriateness of the presumption
altogether, it certainly calls into question the use of the presumption
when it is clear that the presumption is likely to be wrong, i.e., when
the plaintiff has not read the existing warning or instructions.
2. The contributory negligence factor
In many jurisdictions contributory negligence can be a defense
to products liability. While contributory negligence would not have
the direct effect of negating the causation element of the plaintiff's
claim, in some cases, it may be seen as a superseding intervening
cause.78  While this appears to be an additional way for the
manufacturer to escape liability, it may well not be:
An intervening cause, one that comes into operation after the
defendant's negligence has been committed, becomes a "superseding
cause," cutting off the defendant's liability, when the intervening act,
or the type of harm resulting from that intervening act, is not
reasonably foreseeable. 79 There is little argument that the failure of a
consumer to read given warnings or instructions is reasonably
foreseeable. The irony of this is that while a manufacturer may be
able to foresee the contributory negligence of the consumer, and may
take reasonable precautions to protect against it,80 if the warning is
still deemed inadequate, the manufacturer will not be able to argue
75. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944)
(applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in California).
76. See id. at 490.
77. Id.
78. See Paul T. Hayden, Butterfield Rides Again: Plaintif's Negligence as
Superseding or Sole Proximate Cause in Systems of Pure Comparative
Responsibility, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 887, 894 (2000).
79. Id. at 901-02 (citations omitted).
80. For example, placing larger, brighter, warnings in more conspicuous
places.
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successfully that the plaintiffs own negligence was a superseding
cause since the plaintiffs failure to read instructions and warning is
foreseeable.
C. Incentive Effects of the Application of the Presumption
The incentives created for a manufacturer by the presumption in
a no warning case are different from those created in an inadequate
warning case. If a manufacturer provides a warning, the
manufacturer can expect that a jurisdiction applying the presumption
will apply it regardless of whether or not the particular plaintiff/user
read and followed a warning that was given. This being the case, a
manufacturer may choose not to provide a warning at all, finding that
the cost of warning is too great, given that a warning deemed
inadequate will still have the effect of presuming causation. Because
the cost of providing warnings has often been presumed to be low,
many wrongly assume that a manufacturer should and will always
attempt to provide some warning. However, it has been pointed out
that there are collateral costs associated with providing warnings.
81
The cost is not merely that of the actual cost of affixing an
inexpensive label to a product, but also the costs associated with lost
profits from a product containing too many warnings or the costs
associated with "lost effect" of an important warning among
multiple, less necessary ones. 82 This undermines the theory behind
taking the extraordinary step of removing the burden of production
from the plaintiff's prima facie case and allowing a presumption. 3
81. See SHAPO, SEARCH FOR JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 141-42.
82. See id. at 141-43; cf Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and
Causation, supra note 32, at 314-27 (discussing the "costs" consumers
consider when choosing whether to use a product that may be unsafe).
Another problem with determining costs may be that courts tend to ignore the
actual dollar cost to the manufacturer anyway. See SHAPO, SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 131 ("[C]ourts do not usually make... [the cost]
calculation, and it would appear that defendants are hesitant to suggest it."). A
third cost may be the escalating prices of consumer goods. See id. at 62
(discussing the theory that the rising cost of "pro-consumer liability rules" are
actually harmful to low-income consumers as they generally raise the prices of
the goods).
83. There are, of course, multiple reasons why courts apply presumptions.
However, it is frequently assumed that the rate of error is low. Therefore, a
court might better provide a presumption for a substantive policy reason when
the concern about mistake is low. See PARK, supra note 35, at ch. 4 (1998).
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If the stated goal of applying the presumption is to encourage
manufacturers to provide safer products and better warnings,84 then
this goal is adequately achieved by applying the presumption only in
a no warning case. A manufacturer cannot be reasonably expected to
undertake the costs associated with providing warnings only to fail to
provide what would at least be arguably adequate. If the goal is to
encourage manufacturers to warn, then surely this is adequately
accomplished by applying the presumption only in a no warning
case.
To further burden manufacturers facing lawsuits with the
presumption when they have undertaken the cost of warning cannot
be justified as a logical matter. This is further amplified when the
plaintiff admits to not having read the existing warning. It may well
be the case that a plaintiff would have read a better, clearer, brighter,
longer, or shorter warning. But that does not justify removing the
plaintiff's usual burden to prove that assertion, and it creates
economic incentives that do not benefit the consuming public.
Imagine this scenario: Manufacturer X supplies a cleaning
product, which, when mixed with any substance other than water,
creates a toxic gas that can cause permanent damage to nasal
membranes and permanent respiratory damage. Knowing that a
warning is necessary and that any plaintiff who reads it will benefit
from the heeding presumption, Manufacturer X designs a warning
label. Since the plaintiff is presumed to follow the warning, it is in
Manufacturer X's best interest to provide the most effective one so
that the plaintiff will not actually harm him or herself, sue
Manufacturer X, and prevail, given the presumption of causation.
The manufacturer is therefore likely to affix a label to the product
reading something like this:
WARNING - MIXING THIS PRODUCT WITH ANY
SUBSTANCE OTHER THAN WATER WILL CAUSE
PERMANENT DAMAGE TO YOUR NASAL
MEMBRANES, MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO BREATHE
AND CAUSING LIFELONG PAIN. MIX ONLY WITH
WATER. DO NOT MIX WITH OTHER LIQUIDS OR
SOLIDS.
84. See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 718 (N.J. 1993).
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Manufacturer X has been adequately incentivized by the
application of the presumption to the plaintiff who reads and
attempts to follow the instructions. Knowing that this plaintiff will
benefit from the presumption, Manufacturer X is likely to take all
reasonable precautions to avoid being sued. The application of this
same presumption to the plaintiff who never bothers to read this
existing instruction does nothing to add to the incentive.
Imagine that Manufacturer X now has in mind the plaintiff who
does not read the instructions given. In this scenario the
Manufacturer does not have any incentive to provide an adequate
warning because the plaintiff will not read it anyway. There is no
additional benefit to providing a perfect warning that can justify the
shifting of the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Many will
respond, "What if the warning is inadequate because it was difficult
to read, in small type, too long to be adequate, hidden somewhere on
the box?" In that case, the plaintiff will not have a difficult time
proving his or her prima facie case of causation. He or she will be
able to testify and convince the trier of fact that had the warning been
more visible or clearer, that certainly he or she would have read it.
If the question becomes, how does the plaintiff go about proving
that he or she would have read and heeded a better warning, then the
answer lies in the approaches taken by many states that choose not to
employ the presumption at all. There are two options. First, the
subjective standard may be employed. Under this standard, the
plaintiff must simply testify in an attempt to convince the trier of fact
that he would have behaved differently had a better warning been
provided.8 5 The plaintiff bears the usual burden of production -
illustrating, perhaps, that he or she had read and followed strikingly
similar warnings in the past.
The second option is to allow the jury to infer the necessary
element of causation, rather than require the defendant/manufacturer
to rebut a presumption of causation. Some states, such as New York,
allow the jury to make a reasonable inference as to the element of
85. See Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure-
to-Warn Law, 71 N.C.L. REV. 121, 162-63 (1992) (explaining that in states that
do not apply the presumption, plaintiff's testimony is all that is required to
show the plaintiff would have heeded an adequate warning).
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causation from the facts and circumstances that the plaintiff has
presented.86
D. The Benefits to Plaintiffs and Consumers
Finally, there is an added benefit to plaintiffs when the products
liability rules are simpler. It is unclear whether products liability
suits have increased or decreased as a result of any particular change
in tort law. However, a recent article in the New York Times
suggests that the expense related to bringing products liability suits
has caused a decrease in the number of lawsuits brought by
legitimately injured plaintiffs.87 Attorneys are refusing to take cases
that can be won because of the costs associated with litigating
products liability actions.8
The elimination of the heeding presumption in the inadequate
warning case would contribute to a decline in legal costs, since
manufacturers would be required to do less investigative research to
rebut the presumption. The fewer lawsuits manufacturers are
required to defend at a high rate of cost, the less incentive there will
be to litigate other lawsuits at a high rate of cost in an effort to make
up the difference.89  This would allow more plaintiffs, with less
severe injuries, the benefits of a successful lawsuit.
Furthermore, there may be a tradeoff where fewer products
liability judgments are allowed in exchange for an economic and
safety benefit to the general public as well. It may be that the trend
over the years has been an increase in the total number of products
suits, whether legitimate or not, with a number of companies being
forced to file bankruptcy because of the suits.90 This economic
uncertainty may lead to more expensive products, fewer jobs, and
ultimately less safe products. At a speech to the National Press Club
in October 2002, Chairman of ConocoPhillips, Archie Dunham,
asked whether the products liability system really makes the public
safer. He questioned:
86. See Raney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 897 F.2d 94, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1990).
87. See Greg Winter, Jury Awards Soar as Lawsuits Decline on Defective
Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, Late Edition, at Al.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Andre & Velasquez, supra note 11; see also Dunham, supra note
11 (questioning whether products liability suits really make the public safer).
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Are the workers who lose their jobs-and their health
insurance-when their companies are driven into
bankruptcy safer as a result?... Are we safer when
manufacturers stop improving their products for fear that
juries will regard the improvements as proof that the
original products were unsafe? For that matter, are the
people who have suffered real injuries more likely to obtain
speedy redress when the courts are clogged with frivolous
lawsuits? 91
The consuming public will be better-protected when manufacturers
are not forced to account for the countless lawsuits that are filed
against them.
IV. CONCLUSION
The distinction between the application of the heeding
presumption in a no warning case and an inadequate warning case
helps to strike a desirable balance between fairness and incentive
concerns when allocating risk between manufacturer and consumer.
While a principal goal of products liability is to encourage the
manufacture of safer products, this goal is not furthered by the
application of the heeding presumption when a manufacturer has
provided some warning that the user has ignored.
The safety that is supposedly furthered by a warning is only as
effective as the user allows it to be. If a consumer fails to follow
instructions or warnings that are provided by a manufacturer, then
the product's actual safety level remains unchanged. Although a
product may be considered likely to be used in a safe manner when a
warning has been provided, it does not necessarily follow that when
no warning is read or heeded that the product is inherently safer, and
the approach taken in determining causation should reflect this
reality.
Part of the justification that is provided for application of the
heeding presumption is to benefit a plaintiff in overcoming a burden
that is sometimes impossible to meet. It is not, however, intended to
allow a plaintiff to create causation where none exists. If a plaintiff
has failed to read or follow instructions that have been provided by
the manufacturer, then the plaintiff should not be allowed to benefit
91. Dunham, supra note 11.
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from the presumption. The better approach is to require such a
plaintiff to convince the trier of fact that he or she would have
followed a better warning.
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